My translation of Faye’s “Pour en finir avec la
civilisation occidentale,” Éléments 34 (1980). This text distinguishes and
advocates Europe (or Hesperia) over-against “the Western system.” The nouvelle droite-period Faye (before 1987),
whom we see at work here, is quite different from the post-hiatus Faye (1998–2019)
known to the Anglophone world. Note the apparently positive assessment of
political Islam (p. 5) and the opposition to the identitarianism with which he
came to be associated (pp. 6–7).
French original:
PDF of this translation:
Related texts on rival strains in European
thought and deed:
https://ferguscullen.blogspot.com/2020/01/giorgio-locchi-nietzsches-rescuers-1972.html
(Giorgio Locchi)
“This Europe, always on the point of cutting its own
throat in its unholy blindness,” wrote Martin Heidegger in his Introduction to Metaphysics,
[l]ies today in the great pincers between Russia on the one side and America on the other. Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same: the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organisation of the average man. When the farthest corner of the globe has been conquered technologically and can be exploited economically […] and time as history has vanished from all Dasein of all peoples […] there still looms like a spectre over all this uproar the question: for what?—to where?—then what?*
[*
Translator’s note. Transl. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Yale, 2000), with
some pedantic syntactical amendments by me. Faye’s French rendition differs a
little: “‘Cette Europe qui, dans un incalculable aveuglement, se trouve
toujours sur le point de se poignarder elle-même,’ écrit Martin Heidegger dans
son Introduction à la métaphysique, ‘est
prise aujourd’hui dans un étau entre la Russie d'une part et l’Amérique de
l’autre. La Russie et l’Amérique sont, toutes deux, au point de vue
métaphysique la même chose: la même frénésie de l’organisation sans racine de l’homme
normalisé. Lorsque le dernier petit coin du globe terrestre est devenu
exploitable économiquement […] et que le temps comme provenance a disparu de
l’être-là de tous les peuples, alors la question: “Pour quel but? Où allons
nous? et quoi ensuite?” est toujours présente et, à la façon d’un spectre,
traverse toute cette sorcellerie.’”]
In the French countryside, we no longer dance the jig
or sardana on festival days. The juke-box and pinball machine have colonised
the last refuges of folk culture. In a German college, a boy of eighteen dies
at last of an overdose, curled up in a toilet-cubicle. In the suburbs of Lille,
thirty Malians live packed into a cellar. In Bangkok or Honolulu you can get
yourself a girl of fifteen for five dollars. “It’s not prostitution, because
everyone here does is,” states an American tourist brochure. In the suburbs of
Mexico, an American firm manufacturing skateboards lays off a hundred workers.
Houston reckons it’s more cost-effective to set up shop in Bogotá…
Such is the hideous face of the civilisation that,
with an implacable logic, imposes itself on every continent, razing cultures
under one planetary way of life and digesting the socio-political contests of
the peoples which it has submitted to the same standard habits (habitudes de mœurs).* Indeed, why shout
“U.S. go home!” if one wears jeans? For Konrad Lorenz, this civilisation
discovered something worse than servitude or oppression: it invented
“physiological domestication.” And more efficiently than Soviet Marxism, it
realises a social experience of the end of history, with the objective of
assuring the ubiquitous triumph of the bourgeois type, by way of a homogenising
dynamic and a process of cultural involution.
[* Translator’s note. Faye: “les mêmes habitudes de
mœurs (standard habits).”]
We must call this civilisation, in which the peoples
of Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America are stuck today, by its name: it is Western
civilisation. Western civilisation is not European civilisation. It’s the
monstrous progeny of European culture—which imprinted it with its dynamism and
spirit of enterprise, but to which it’s fundamentally opposed—and of
egalitarian ideologies derived from Judeo-Christian monotheism. It arose in
America, which, in the aftermath of the Second World War, gave it its decisive
impulse. The monotheist component of Western civilisation, identical in
substance to that of Soviet society, is indeed clearly noticeable in its
project: to impose a universal civilisation founded on the domination of the
economy as class-of-life (classe-de-vie)
and to depoliticise peoples to the profit of global “management.”
It’s therefore worth distinguishing Western civilisation from the Western system, which denotes the power that
drives the expansion of the former. The Western system cannot, besides, be
described in terms of a homogeneous power, constituted as such. It organises
itself through a global network of micro-decisions, coherent but inorganic,
which renders it relatively ungraspable and, to that extent, the more
formidable. It encompasses the OECD business community, the managements of a
hundred transnational corporations, a large percentage of the political
personnel of “Western” nations, ruling circles of conservative “elites” in poor
countries, part of the executives of international institutions, and most of
the highest functionaries of banking institutions in the “developed” world. The
Western system has its epicentre in the United States. It isn’t essentially
political or statal, but proceeds by the mobilisation of the economy. Disregarding
states, borders, religions, its “theory of praxis” rests less on the diffusion
of an ideological corpus, or on constraint, than on the radical modification of
cultural formations, oriented towards the American model.
But whoever thinks of the “West” thinks immediately of
the “Third World.” It’s said that Alfred Sauvy coined this term a little after
the conference of non-aligned nations at Bandung in 1955. But does the Third World
exist? As a matter of fact, Soviet Leninism conceived the concept well before
the term existed. In Imperialism, the
Last Stage of Capitalism (1916), Lenin founds the doctrine that now inspires,
more than ever, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union: to utilise poor
countries as a mass to move against global capitalism, to make them objects of
history and of revolution. Identical in this respect to Western liberalism, the
Leninist ideology subordinates the independence of peoples to its universalist
project. Leninism, which is an Occidentalism at its root, doesn’t envision
national difference, and doesn’t conceive the nationalism of non-European
peoples other than as a provisional instrument in the service of the same
project as that of Occidentalism: one global homogeneous civilisation founded
on economy. Besides, Karl Marx himself announces this kinship of Leninism and Western
liberalism. In the British Rule in India and
The Future Results of British Rule in
India (1853), he was pleased to note that “British domination has
completely demolished the strictures of Indian society,” and that “this part of
the world, until then remaining inferior, is now annexed to the Western world.”
For there is no greater obstacle to “socialism” than traditional societies. Did
Georges Marchais not say that it was to abolish the droit du seigneur that the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan?
Does the Third World, then, encompass those peoples
that, renouncing their own cultural identity, become candidates for Westernisation,
as proletarians for bourgeoisification? Where necessary nurturing a resentment
against their model? The strength of the Western system, objectively complicit
in this regard with the Leninist project, is in understanding that the desire
to assimilate always prevails over resentment: the Third World doesn’t threaten
it. For the Venezuelan Carlos Rangel, “the essence of Third-Worldism is neither
poverty nor underdevelopment,” but “a discontentment that impedes neither a Western
way of live nor an ostentatious wealth” (“Pourquoi l’Occident est en train de
perdre le Tiers-Monde,” Politique
internationale, Spring 1979). For Rangel, “peoples belong to the Third World
who, though very dissimilar, share the same deep sense of alienation from and
antagonism towards successful non-communist countries, and who find themselves
in relation to the latter in a position analogous to that of populations of
colour in a society where power is in the hands of whites.” These peoples,
Rangel continues, don’t feel themselves “founding members of the club called Western
civilisation.” Even Japan or Spain, and France at a pinch, “will never be as
integrated into Western capitalist society as New Zealand, which shares
culturally in the source from which capitalism takes its impulse”—to wit, “the
Anglo-Saxon hegemony installed by England and which the United States have
taken up.” Rangel adds: “The slightest lack of identification with the primary
source of ideas, and with the current seat of power, is an unavoidable cause of
national anxiety and dissatisfaction.”
Membership of the third world, or of Western
civilisation, thus remains a cultural fact. It’s the whole planet that’s
experiencing an identity crisis. Like equality always proclaimed and never
achieved, the Western model contains a logic of alienation. Western
civilisation presents itself explicitly as a purely economic ensemble whose
primary condition of membership is quality of life (niveau de vie); but implicitly, this civilisation structures itself
hierarchically in two cultural levels: the “club” members and the “others,” who
can never be better than half-Western, and who can never join the “club.” Why?
Because they don’t belong to the Anglo-American world, which thinks itself the
epicentre of the West. Also, Western civilisation, because of its dominant
Anglo-American element, itself rejects any identification with European
culture, particularly in light of the Latin, Germanic, Celtic or Slavic
components of the latter. But this dichotomy might be pushed even further: to
the degree that Western civilisation fully expresses the American project, and
that America constitutes itself on a rejection of Europe, the essence of
Western civilisation is the rupture with European culture, which it attacks
even by dissolving it through cultural ethnocide and political neutralisation.
Western neo-colonialism—such as manifests itself in
all parts of the world, from Ireland to Indonesia—is grounded essentially in
American liberal ideology, which has imposed itself on international
organisations. We would never finish citing those peoples whose own forms of
sovereignty have been destroyed to the benefit of a “democracy” designed to
integrate these peoples into the Western and mercantile economic order.
Neo-colonialism instituted the direst of dependencies and obliterated the chief
among liberties, which consists, for a people, in governing itself according to
its own world-conception.
And it’s the local bourgeoisie, created by the West, that becomes the
instrument of that politico-cultural dispossession.*
[* Author’s note. Cf. the studies carried out by the
Africanologist Hubert Deschamp on the destruction of cultural forms of African
sovereignty by “democracy,” notably the systems of balanced anarchy and of
chiefdom proper to certain American peoples.]
It’s the very idea of Third-World economic development
that we ought, in fact, to suspect. This notion presupposes in effect that the
peoples of the Third World ought necessarily to follow the path of Western
industrialisation. Now this accords singularly well with the liberal desire for
international division of labour and economic specialisation of zones,
indispensable for the modern capitalism of planetary free exchange. And who,
under doctrinal and humanitarian camouflage (the “right to development”) thus
advocates Third-World industrialisation? Those who defend the interests of an
economic system in which the growth of global industrial commerce is as
necessary as warm water for mackerel shoals.* Again and again, François Perroux
has shown that the “overall quality of life” in “developing” countries that are
considered already nearly developed, was lower than that achieved by
traditional societies. Inversely, poorer countries, or less industrialised
zones, know a real “quality of life” superior to what OECD figures might have
one believe.** And until today, the United States have been the only real
beneficiaries of the industrialisation of Asia, Africa and South America.
[* Author’s note. It’s interesting to note that
despite the theoretical positions of Marxist economists, socialist countries
have practiced upon the Third World the same economic mercantilism as
capitalist countries. The exterior economic practice of socialism is capitalist
and mercantile.]
[** Author’s note. Cf. Daniel Joussen, “La faim n’est
qu’une consequence,” Le Monde (29
December 1979).]
But we mustn’t delude ourselves: the industrialisation
of the planet is irreversible. The share of consumption of Asia or Latin America
never ceases to grow. On the other hand, it’s the form of this
industrialisation, free-exchangist and subject to the Western development
model, which must be critiqued. Inasmuch as industrial structures resemble one
another, modes of consumption are standardised and Americanised. Besides, if
this form of industrialisation is a factor of “development” for certain
countries, it’s the source of serious instability and under-development for
many others: “Four fifths of industrial exports of new countries,” writes Jean
Lemperière, “are provided by nine countries: the workshops of the Far East,
India, the three greater Latin American countries, and Israel” (Le Monde, 22 January 1980).
In the end, a globalised industrial economy will turn
out to be of an extreme fragility in the face of crisis, given the network of
dependencies which it weaves between nations. On the other hand,
“ethno-national” ideologies might very well help certain peoples free
themselves from Western neo-colonialism. These ideologies appeared in Europe
from the beginning of the fourteenth century and already opposed a considerable
universalism—that of ecclesiastical power.* They appealed to the constitution
of a secular state coextensive with the nation, and referred themselves to the
galvanising myth of ancient Roman imperium.
Reprised by Fichte and Herder in the eighteenth century, ethno-national ideas
aspire to radically challenge universalist and individualist ideologies, and
themselves played an important role in movements of national liberation in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
[* Author’s note. Around 1300, Pierre Dubon, jurist of
Philippe le Bel, urges the abolition of papal and ecclesiastical power. In the
fourteenth century, in France and Italy, intellectuals envisages the
nation-state as the political structure of European peoples, and extolled the
idea of national power. These themes were reprised by Petrarch and Machiavelli,
who were also inspired by Marsilius of Padova, theoretician, from 1342, of the
autonomous, secular state, and of the replacement with political nationalism of
the theocratic idea.]
It’s also thanks to nationalist ideology that the
peoples of Africa, Asia and America might mobilise against colonialism. Today,
it’s still ethno-nationalism that, alone, might break the yoke of Western (or
Soviet) neo-colonialism. “There is an adaptation,” writes Marcel Rouvier, “of
the European ethno-national ideological model, because it corresponds to the
exigencies of the situation of the Third-World in the twentieth century”; and
the success of this ideology is foreseeable “with the decline of Marxist
universalism, which had remained its sole serious competitor.” For Rouvier, the
major theme of ethno-national combat is “the development of ideas in the
essential quest for identity as the primary motor of history, for the
permanence of a foundation which is
the transmutation of the romanticist Volksgeist,
for the deep legitimacy of a healthy nationalitarianism
(nationalitarisme).”
In Mexico, a country carved up by the United States,
we thus witness the construction, by the state and by the people, of an
original nationalism, founded on the regeneration of an historic conscience
which finds its specific foundations in Indian cultures. A new people thus
create themselves, freed from “Western” history, and rethinking their destiny
beginning with the recreation of their past. A beautiful lesson for us
Europeans, who, beyond that “Western Christendom” in which we can no longer
recognise ourselves, must also rethink our destiny by rediscovering the
specific foundations of our culture in constructing an Indo-European myth.
In Africa, the adaptation of ethno-national ideology
has also emerged, but under a less political and historical form than tribal
and communitarian: “The value of African culture doesn’t concern certain
phantasms or complexes repressed before Greek canons of beauty,” says—not
without malice—the Senegalese cineaste Sembène Ousmane (Jeune Afrique, 19 September 1979). The search for authenticity, the choice of surnames and
the return to traditional patriarchal customs, fought by Christianity and the
United Nations, can make only idiots and scoundrels smile.
As for Islamic nationalism, it constitutes the
happiest blow yet dealt to the civilising utopia of the American model. It
calls into question the Western idea of mercantile growth and the primacy of
economic development, while rejecting Marxism, rightly judged to be a factor of
deculturation and, accessorily, as the instrument of Soviet neo-colonialism.
It’s also thanks to a surge in national conscience
that China can attenuate the massifying effect of Marxism, and can thus effect
a likely positive synthesis between ideas coming from the West and the pursuit
of her destiny as people-continent (people-continent).
She knew to adapt her ancestral cultural structures
of sovereignty, and to constitute, “trusting in her own strength,” an
historic power as independent of the Western mélange as from the Soviet bloc. It isn’t without good reason that
China feels the need to no longer take on the role of historical actor alone,
faced with two great universalisms, the American West and Russian “Sovietism.”
In this game of three players, she can only ally itself to her opponent—the
Soviet Union today, the United States tomorrow—she needs an partner-actor to
join her. This is why it appeals to Europe, inciting the latter to shake off
her lethargy, to re-enter history, to reconquer her liberty.
As China frees herself from “Sovietism,” so Europe
must free herself from the West and reappropriate for herself the
ethno-national ideologies she generated. To free oneself from Western
civilisation is to begin by doubting the idea of Western solidarity imposed on
Africa as upon Europe or Japan. For one must clearly distinguish, in
geopolitics, between factual solidarities
(solidarités factuelles) and real solidarities (solidarités réelles)—that’s to say, solidarities at once desirable
and in conformity with historical interests and the people in question. The
West and the Soviet bloc consist of ensembles of merely factual solidarity.
Poland or Federal Germany, like Chile or Afghanistan, are not enmeshed in
ensembles of real solidarity. Now the “Third-Worldist” left and “Occidentalist”
right enforce, with concepts generated by their ideological vocabularies, the
global status quo of blocs of factual
solidarity. A new geopolitics begins with new definitions. The West and the
Third World must disappear as geopolitical concepts. Let us speak of Europe,
the United States, Latin America, the Soviet Union, or India. We must rethink
the world in terms of organic ensembles of real solidarity: continental
communities of destiny, groups of coherent peoples, “optimally” homogeneous by
virtue of their traditions, their geography, their ethno-cultural components.
“The nation,” writes François Perroux,
[a] living and dynamic reality, becomes one of the essential sources of energy to restructure global society and its economy […]. The earthbound coagulate into armed nations, into empires, into hesitant communities, trying economically to form regions of nations (Bertrand Russell). One finds these assemblies—neither closed, which is impossible, nor unreservedly welcoming […]. In these associations of nations, there must be collective projects of infrastructure, investment, distribution of products and of revenues. It’s to the degree that these nations, witnesses and defenders of peoples, favour this deconcentration of economic powers and this decentralisation of their effects, that a certain reciprocity of development is outlined, which is not spontaneously generated by the interplay of private interests [Le Monde de l'économie, 9 October 1979].
These associations of nations are geopolitically
possible, and they rupture current economic-strategic confines. Each great
planetary region might thus be seen to coincide, in its living-space, with a
related cultural heritage, a community of political interests, a certain ethnic
and historic homogeneity, and macroeconomic factors that make possible, in
time, autonomous development without recourse to international beggary.* A new nomos of the earth, to borrow Carl
Schmitt’s expression, might thus see the light of day, founded on a society of communities, and no longer on
a pseudo-community of societies.
[* Author’s note. For certain liberal economists, aid
to underdeveloped countries ought, it’s true, be limited to aiding firms that
invest in those countries. “By making aid to the Third World benefit industry,”
said a senior French functionary, “we might at last make aid to industry
benefit the Third World.”]
But these cultures, one could say, would no longer
communicate with one another. Precisely the inverse is true. In communicating
with one another with Western civilisation as a common reference, cultures in
fact establish a pseudo-communication. This common reference in effect
alienates the personality of those that use it. The signifier (Western cultural
language) substitutes itself for the signified (the local culture that tries to
express itself in Western language). In short, peoples know themselves less and
less closely; cultures no longer communicate, and no longer manage to enrich
themselves, because they use an infra-cultural Esperanto which belongs to
anybody and everybody. Sharing in the same customs of language, dress, diet,
etc., man can no longer perceive the specificities of his fellow man—where they
survive. An Italian in Thailand will use English, descend on an international
hotel, and will only see Thai customs as marginalised folklore. If he goes to
Africa, the Africans with whom he mingles will be “three-piece-suit-briefcases”
(costards-trois-pièces-attaché-case),
in the pungent words of the Ivorian lawyer Badibanga. What will he know of
African man? On the other hand, when Marco Polo arrived in China, the communication
was real and fertile, despite the absence of common reference; and the
influence of Chinese culture was significant in Europe thereafter. Cultures are
incommensurable: they can only be understood from within; but they might
influence “from the wings,” and profit by contact—not by mixture. The idea of
the interpenetration of cultures, or the mechanist illusion of a universal
measure of the “best” of cultures, an idea defended notably by Léopold Senghor,
can bring about nothing but the impoverishment of all cultures, and the
enforcement of Western infra-cultural language. Language alienates because it
doesn’t rest on the anthropological support of any people; and in this respect,
it doesn’t bear any meaning.
For Martin Heidegger, the term Western doesn’t express the essence
of Europe. He prefers to use the enigmatic word Hesperian to denote the essence of European modernity—or, more
precisely, its possible future, its virtuality. The advent of the Hesperian therefore presupposes the
death, in Europe, of the Western.
Appendices
[Translator's note. These appeared as highlighted inserts in the
original.]
1. There Is No “White World”
All dominant ideologies oppose, in their discourse,
the Third World and the West. Whatever criteria be taken into
account, these definitions all function according to the same principle of exclusion.
Christianity was the first to thus oppose infidels
and believers, perpetuating
across centuries the Manichaean vision of the world. In the eighteenth century,
the noble savage may well have known
a paradisiacal existence: he nonetheless remains a “savage,” to which
philosophers this time oppose the civilised.
Inverting this proposition, rationalism in its turn distinguishes civilised Western peoples from uncivilised peoples. In their analysis
of economic growth, liberal theories have themselves merely opposed the developed West to the developing Third World. Be they right or
left, progressive or reactionary, occidentalist ideologies remain in submission
to this Manichaean logic. Occidentalism negates the identity of the Other,
which it perceives in the end as non-Christian,
uncivilised or undeveloped…without imagining for a second that this Other might
simply be itself. This repudiation of difference marks an essentially racist
course. Implicitly, it’s always the white
world that opposes itself to the world
of colour. The very notion of the West is in fact the product of an
ideology, and contains no geopolitical, cultural, or even economic reality (how
to class Argentina—white developing
country?—or Japan—hyper-developed
country of colour?). These words are not neutral. The concept of the West
ensnares who uses it. To speak of the West is, in the end, to recognise its
existence and to admit the logic it carries. It’s to adopt implicitly the
ideology of which it’s the product.
2. Decolonisation Must Be Redone
Is the Westernisation of the planet itself, as we
generally assert, the historical consequence of European colonialism? Very
widespread in progressive milieus, this thesis doesn’t seem particularly
accurate. European colonialism, as manifested from the sixteenth to twentieth
centuries, must in fact be clearly distinguished from the Western neo-colonialism
that succeeded it. Traditional European colonialism expressed a hegemonic and
imperial will, which needn’t entail the destruction of the values of the
colonised. But from the nineteenth century, European colonialism was also the
articulation of a “civilising” will, stemming from the philosophical
universalism of the century of Enlightenment, which urged the coloniser to
assimilate the colonised, and dispossess him of his values. In condemning, in
the name of a humanist and Messianic ethic, the hegemonic and imperial will of
European powers, the United States contributed in a decisive way to the
dismantling of colonial empires. Not that they might free the colonised
peoples, but to substitute for the traditional colonial order, essentially
political, a neo-colonialism retaining nothing of colonialism but the
“civilising” will. Thus “Westernised,” neo-colonialism does nothing but
entrench the dangers that the old European colonialism brought down on the
identity of colonised peoples. It’s thus that those peoples, having just
escaped European colonial influence, find themselves irresistibly suppressed by
Western neo-colonialism, without these people able to resist it. How, indeed,
can they revolt against the network of influences that enfolds local
bourgeoisies, multinationals, political milieus, etc.? When a master is
visible, one might recognise him as an enemy and free oneself; but
neo-colonialism submits peoples to a “system of live,” and no longer to the
political power of another nation, as in traditional European colonialism. How
can one combat a phantom coloniser? The answer reveals itself:
“neo-decolonisation” must be metapolitical and cultural.
3. When the West Forgot Greece
It’s in Der
Spruch des Anaximander, an exegetical text on a fragment of pre-Socratic
philosophy, that Martin Heidegger introduces the concept of Abend-Land. He opposes it to Abendland (West) and, in the translation
of Wolfgang Brockmeier, Abend-Land has
been very happily rendered by Hespérie
(Hesperia) and hespérial (Hesperian).
Hesperia is, as the Greek root indicates, the land of sunset. But it doesn’t denote the West, nor the western
regions of the world, but rather a project
of world-organisation bearing the marks of sunset—that is, of the fulfilment
of an auroral worldview, expressed in
the seventh century before our era by the first European thinker. Heidegger
writes: “The greatest event begins: the forgetfulness of being, in which
Hesperian world-History comes and goes.” For Heidegger, European man has been
by turns “Greek,” “Christian,” “modern,” “planetary,” or even “Western” or
“American”; he must today become “Hesperian”:
“The antiquity that brings about the words of Anaximander,”
writes Heidegger,
[b]elongs to the morning of the dawn of Hesperia […]. If we persist so obstinately in thinking the thought of the Greeks as the Greeks knew to think it, it’s not for love of the Greeks: it’s to rediscover this Identical which, in diverse guises, concerns the Greeks and concerns us historically. It’s that, which carries the dawn of thought into the destiny of the Hesperian. It’s in conformity with this destiny that only the Greeks become the Greeks, in a historical sense. Destiny awaits what becomes of its seed.
The Hesperian represents,
at the same time, the sunset of the
Greek metaphysical tradition and the virtual beginning of another cycle which fulfils Greek thought at another
level—that of self-conscious will-to-power. The Hesperian is thus at once a
restarting, a deep return to the dawn—that
is, to the Greek conception of the world—and a rupture with the Western, which has itself forgotten
Greece. Returning to Hesperia, for us Europeans, consists, then, in fulfilling
our will-to-power as Europeans, conscious
of our Greek heritage, and no longer as Westerners, forgetful of that heritage.
The Hesperian is the European who becomes conscious that he’s Greek, and who
therefore rejects the West as non-Greek, and ends by forgetting himself; who
will have “meditated on the disarray of the present destiny of the world”; and
will consciously fulfil the Greek
vision of the world.
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