Notes on Panagiotis Kondylis, “Conservatism as a Historical Phenomenon.” This is to my knowledge the only substantial excerpt from Kondylis’ Konservativismus (Stuttgart, 1986) available in English. The translation is by “C.F.” from “Ὁ συντηρητισμὸς ὡς ἱστορικὸ φαινόμενο,” Λεβιάθαν, 15 (1994), pp. 51–67, and remains unpublished, but discoverable in PDF format online. Page references below are to that PDF. I have altered the translation very slightly in some places.
Kondylis aims to
understand conservatism not as a “historical” or “anthropological constant,”
but as a “concrete historical phenomenon” bound to, and thus coterminous with, a
time and a place (pp. 1–2). But even such historicist scholarship often takes
too narrow a view, according to which conservatism is a reaction against, and
thus “derivative” of, the Revolution, or, at best, against Enlightenment
rationalism (pp. 2–3).
Kondylis disputes the conception, often a conservative self-conception, of conservatism as an expression of the “natural […] psychological-anthropological predisposition” of “conservative man” to be “peace-loving and conciliatory” (pp. 5–6). On the contrary, conservatism and “activism” are perfectly compatible, as the “feudal right of resistance and ‘tyrannicide,’ the uprising and rebellion of aristocrats against the throne” shows (pp. 7–8). This is a point against the claim by Klemperer and others that the activism of Conservative Revolutionists is fundamentally unconservative.
“[L]ove and cultivation
of tradition” as a “legitimation” of noble privileges is an expression of those
nobles’ will to self-preservation and “sense of superiority.” Kondylis posits such
a universal will, in place of a conservative disposition at war with a
revolutionary “urge to overthrow” (at least as concerns the history of ideas: pp.
8–9).
Kondylis also disputes
the self-conception (“idealised image”) of the conservative as uncritically
traditionalist and sceptical of “intellectual constructions,” based upon “the
erroneous impression that pre-revolutionary societas
civilis did not know of ideas and ideologies, both as systematic intellectual
constructions and as weapons” (pp. 9–10). Mediaeval “theological” systems are
the equals of modern ideologies in “argumentative refinement,” “systematic
multilateralism” and “pretension to universal” (or “catholic”) “validity” (p.
10). Conservatism consists in the “reformulation” of the “legitimising ideology
of societas civilis” into an “answer”
to the Enlightenment and Revolution (pp. 10–1).
Modernity, for Kondylis, comes
about, in part through “lively ideological activity,” not as a result of the “anthropological
constitution” of certain persons (intellectual disposition), but as an
expression of their basic will to self-preservation, which, given their “lack
of weighty social power had to be counterbalanced by their pre-eminence on the intellectual
front”; and so conservatives responded in kind (polemic, theory, etc.). The
partisans of modernity (“foes of the social dominance of the hereditary
aristocracy”) made the first crucial step into political discourse in the
modern sense, and were thus “much more intensively reflexive,” just as conservatism
is generally purported to be (pp. 11–2).
This, “the importance of
theory among the foe’s weaponry,” is also the origin of conservatism’s “purely
polemical abhorrence” for intellectuality (p. 12). Not only should conservatism’s
professed anti-intellectualism be taken as suspect; but in certain intriguing
cases, it should be understood as a sort of demonstration of a theoretical
understanding of theory’s (intellectuality’s) role in “Progress” (“Decline”). As
Kondylis says: “only theoretically could the idealised description of a ‘healthy’
and ‘organic’ society be made which is not created by abstract theories, nor
does it need them” (p. 13).
This “vacillation and
indecisiveness” of conservatism re. intellectuality, “Reason,” etc. (i.e. this
apparent performative—if not contradiction then—tension, ambiguity), mirrors
the tension in the intense ratiocination by Mediaeval theology to show the
limits of man’s reason, or by Enlightenment sentimentalism or modern Lebensphilosophie to set instinct above
intellect (p. 13). This “indecisiveness” (a telling word, when one recalls
Kondylis’ contributions to décisionnisme)
and the accompanying unsystematicity and proliferous variety of conservative
thought is “natural” to “all the great political—and not only political—ideologies”
(pp. 13–4; see part
2 here).
“[C]ommonplaces of conservative
self-understanding and self-presentation have crept […] into the scientific discussion,” such as “the
coquettish enmity of conservatives towards theory.” The prioritization of the “concrete”
over the “abstract” is itself, or relies upon, an abstraction (p. 15).
Kondylis dichotomizes “conservative”
and “revolutionary” politics (p. 17).
“Prudent and sagacious adaptation to circumstances and
conditions, of which conservatives are so proud, is carried out as a rule under
the foe’s pressure”; the foe “pushes conservatives to adopt a defensive or good-natured and easy-going stance”; “conservatives
discover their sympathy for ‘true’ progress, and […] talk of the dynamic organic development […] of society and of
history” (p. 18). Conservatives are compelled to make certain concessions to
modernity. To anticipate my own arguments a bit: revolutionary
conservatism is a concession, but, loosely speaking, to the form and not
the content of modernity. That is, the conservative revolutionary accepts, must
accept, industrialisation, the dissolution of “organic society,” the
instrumentalisation of man, secular discourse as the space of (even religious)
political discourse, “mediatisation,” mass communication, etc., and wishes to put
these at the service of “conservative,” “rightist” principles: that is, abstractions
from the concrete expressions that gave birth to conservatism.
Sometimes conservative
principles are, or seem to be, expressed concretely without conservative effort,
or as a result of “the foe’s” effort, who, “by struggling for the consolidation
of his own domination, cares for, or is concerned with, compliance with law,
with hierarchy and with property (legally or in actual reality safeguarded and
protected)—of course, with different signs and with different content” (p. 20).
A liberal or democratic, bourgeois or proletarian “conservatism” can form on
this basis, opposed, it would seem as a general rule, by conservative
revolution (the bifurcation of C.R. and “mere conservatism”).
Both conservatives and
revolutionaries posit “natural” laws or a “natural” condition of man; but both
struggle to answer, in the conservative case, the apparently natural
development of unnatural conditions (Revolution, “Progress,” “Decline”), or, in
the revolutionary case, the apparent primordiality of unnatural conditions
(inequality, exploitation, etc.: p. 21). We might add that the revolutionary
also struggles to answer how, as suggested in the previous paragraph, his own
efforts seem to not only lead to such conditions but instantiate, express
concretely, his enemy’s, the conservative’s, principles. Here we approach
theodicy.
On Kondylis’ model,
conservatism is the ideological expression of noble privilege and of “the
resistance of societas civilis
against its own decomposition”: against the rise of the bourgeoisie,
Enlightenment rationalism, democratisation, etc., apparently ending with “the sidelining
of the primacy of agriculture by the primacy of industry”; thereafter “there
can be talk of conservatism only metaphorically or with polemical-apologetic
intent” (pp. 22–3). Schema: conservatism —
liberalism — socialism, in which each overcomes the prior term to culminate
in a questionable postmodernity in which “every [concept] passes over into, or
merges with, another, and none of them are precise,” indicating “that the end
of that historical epoch, from whose social-political and intellectual life
they partially or wholly drew their content, is, in part, near and approaching,
and has, in part, already come” (p. 23).
The reason to posit a
conservative-revolutionary current within this categorially confused, and thus
not yet quite navigable, postmodernity is that something, a new (proto-) category, does emerge out of and in tandem with the first warning tremors of postmodernity
(industrialisation and mass democracy: the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, with the Great War as the first in a series of watersheds). To wit, a
conscious or subconscious radicalisation and abstraction of conservative
principles, at whose service certain aspects of late modernity are put (see above).
(My thanks to Robert Steuckers, who has republished this post at Euro-Synergies, with illustrations, and published a French translation.)
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